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During the past three decades, innumerable systems have been computerized
to improve efficiency in accounting and operational activities. In the past
few years, decision support systems (DSS's) have come into their own and
flourished in many companies. Recently, with the advent of the personal
computer, computer-based assistance for all functions of the business is
becoming widespread in a number of companies today.
In the midst of this computer-based explosion, one significant ingredient
has been noticeably missing. For the most part, top management of the
corporation has stood -- uninvolved -- at the sidelines. In well-managed
companies, top executives have given their approval to information systems
budgets, blessed long-range plans, and reviewed very major projects and
hardware decisions. Yet, for the most part, they have been spectators,
essentially uninvolved in the very vital process of information systems
planning and use. Of real significance, with a few notable exceptions, senior
executives have given little thought to improving corporate effectiveness
through their own direct computer-based use of corporate data. Almost total
responsibility for information systems has been delegated to an information
system director or vice-president.
Until very recently, this posture made some sense. Information systems
were essentially paperwork-processing systems. They accounted for a
relatively small percentage of the budget. Although some systems were vital
to the day-to-day operations of the company, their functions were
well-defined. As such, they could be designed and implemented by personnel
far beneath executive rank.
Today, however, there are a number of factors which make greater top
management understanding and involvement increasingly critical. Not the least
of these factors is the ever-growing budget for hardware, software, and
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personnel at all levels in the organization, which has become an increasing
source of managerial concern. Equally significant is the outpouring of new
information systems technology. This new technology provides a potential for
any corporation to beneficially invest in computer-based systems to a much
greater extent than any corporation can fully finance in the next few years.
And there appears to be wave after wave of new technology coming. The
development of priorities for systems development has become crucial.
In addition, the movement of information system hardware and software
capabilities from merely facilitating the automation of clerical tasks to
providing direct on-line support for decision-making and other managerial
processes, has opened up the potential for top corporate executives to focus
on their own information needs. Finally, and perhaps most significant, the
new information/communication technology is having a significant impact on
business strategy itself. As has been demonstrated by companies such as
Merrill Lynch, American Hospital Supply and Foremost-McKesson, significant
competitive advantage can be gained through judicial use of the new
technology. l1,2]
Today there is a clear need for top management to get off the sidelines.
Although the need is felt to differing degrees, there is a heightened
awareness in almost all senior executives that they must drop their passive
role with regard to information systems. There is a clear need to link
information systems to business strategy and, especially, to ensure that
business strategy is developed in the context of the new information
technology environment. In short, there is an increasingly felt need for
senior executives to become informed, energized, involved, and engaged with
regard to information systems. There is an increasing desire on the part of
corporate executives to feel comfortable that their organizations are
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proceeding along appropriate lines in utilizing the technology in the best
interests of the corporation.
We believe that developing this active engagement of top management with
information systems is highly desirable in organizations of every size. One
means to accomplish this is the three-step process illustrated here. In this
paper, we describe the experience with, and results of, this process at
Southwestern Ohio Steel (SOS), one of the top ten steel service centers in the
United States, with sales of approximately $80 million.
The process illustrated here was carried out at SOS under the direction of
Thomas Heldman, Chief Financial Officer. The work was shared by Index
Systems, a consulting organization, and SOS personnel. This paper is based on
data from SOS, Index, and a two-day evaluation interview process carried out
by personnel at the Center for Information Systems Research (CISR) of the
Sloan School of Management at MIT.
The process involved is based on three major concepts. These are:
e critical'- success factors
* decision scenarios
e prototyping.
The remainder of this paper describes the company involved, the process
itself, and an evaluation of the process' ability to engender managerial
understanding of information systems needs and to produce managerial action in
appropriate directions. As the impact of the process on the understanding of
top management can be- evaluated best through their own perceptions, this
narrative will be laced with the commentary of the managers involved.
Southwestern Ohio Steel - A Changing Environment
Southwestern Ohio Steel is one of the major forces in the steel service
center industry in the United States. Located in Hamilton, Ohio, with a
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processing plant in Middletown, Ohio, it employs more than 400 people. Steel
of differing quality, including primes and seconds as well as overruns, are
purchased from major steel companies and merchandised directly to hundreds of
customers throughout the Midwest and contiguous states. By far the majority
of the steel is processed to some extent (e.g., slitted, sheared) before
shipment to an SOS customer. Through close attention to both merchandizing
and manufacturing processes, SOS has developed an image of quality and service
to both its customers and suppliers. A key factor in this is SOS's capability
of providing customized products quickly, through extreme flexibility in its
production schedule.
In early 1982, SOS utilized its existing computer installation only to
perform routine accounting functions. At that time, however, management was
becoming convinced that several factors indicated a major review of
information systems capability. These factors were:
e The company's planning process clearly indicated that, despite
possible stagnant growth in the steel industry, SOS could be expected
to continue to grow significantly. Steel service centers were
becoming an increasingly accepted and utilized service by American
industry. Service centers' share of the steel end market had grown
from 17% in 1960 to 23% in the early 80's and was expected to be in
the high twenties by 1990. Two competitive advantages facilitated
this. First, the steel centers' ability to hold and pre-process
steel vastly decreased the inventories needed to be maintained by
their customers. In addition, a growing trend toward "just-in-time"
delivery, as more firms turned to the essentials of Japanese
management, was providing a competitive edge over the less
delivery-oriented steel manufaturers.
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These very positive factors, however, were, in turn, making the
steel service center business increasingly complex. The complexity
of inventory and manufacturing management at SOS had grown
significantly. With customers maintaining lower inventory levels, a
vastly increased number of "hot orders" (overnight or next day
delivery) were complicating plant operations. In addition, the
growing use of MRP systems by a number of firms was providing a call
for smaller lots and more frequent deliveries.
* At SOS, it was also clear that information systems capability was
strained. Existing systems, installed by the company's accounting
firm, were doing a superb job of providing the accounting personnel
with data, but all key managerially-oriented information remained
manual.
* Finally, the management team was changing. The first-generation
management of the family-owned organization was giving way to a
newer, younger mangerial team, two of whom were sons of the original
top management. There was a need to pass on knowledge and build into
systems some of the expertise and perspective which had been gained
over a number of years by the departing key executives.
An Unsuccessful First Attempt
Management's first instinct was to turn once again to the company's
accounting firm. The solution they proposed came as a shock to the senior
executives of the steel firm. It was a series of on-line computerized
information systems based on "tried-and-true" conventional systems design and
implementation processes. The cost was estimated at $2.4 million over the
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course of four years. Furthermore, major results and benefits were forecast
not to be apparent until after the fourth year.
Management rejected this approach. All members of the management team
felt quite uncomfortable with the pricetag, timeframe, and overall risk
associated with the project. Perhaps most important, the exact tie between
the systems proposed and the real needs of the business was unclear.
At this point, Tom Heldman, the chief financial officer, embarked on a
search. "I wasn't quite sure what I wanted. But I knew there had to be a
more creative approach toward assisting top management to understand its
systems needs and to bring up systems more quickly, with reduced risk and
cost." Heldman found what he wanted in a process, described below, developed
by Index Systems, a Cambridge, Mass. based consulting firm.
A Three-Phase Process for Managerial Involvement
Exhibit 1 outlines the three major phases of the process used at
Southwestern Ohio Steel. Each phase has two or three sub-parts (or steps) and
a particular "key" technique associated with it. Taken in turn, the three
techniques assured managerial involvement from the earliest planning stages
through a very interactive implementation process. The three phases were:
* A "linking" phase utilizing the critical success factors technique.
During this phase management developed a clear definition of SOS's
business and came to agreement on its most critical business
functions. In addition, it took a first cut at stating its
information systems needs in these critical areas.
· The second or "confidence building" phase consisted of developing
managerial understanding that the priority systems defined above
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would deliver the necessary information to support key decisions. In
this stage, decision scenarios were utilized.
* Finally, in the "development" phase, systems were built utilizing a
prototype approach. In this approach, initial, partial systems were
brought up very quickly at low cost. In working with these systems,
management was able to more fully grasp their usefulness and to
authorize, with significantly greater comfort, continued system
development. As a by-product, initial benefits from these systems
were received very rapidly.
THE FIRST PHASE - LINKING TO THE BUSINESS
Emphasis in this phase is on understanding the business, focusing on the
few factors which drive the business, and in engaging management actively in
the process. Only at the very end of this phase is the initial link to
information requirements for the key areas of the business made. As Exhibit 2
shows, the first phase is divided into three steps. These are an introductory
workshop, critical success factor (CSF) interviews, and an all-important
"focusing workshop" in which the results of the interviews and their
implications are thoroughly worked through.
Introductory Workshop. Participating in this initial workshop were the
five key members of the management team. They were William Huber, Chairman of
the Board; Joseph Wolf, President; Tom Heldman, Vice President of Finance;
Jacque Huber, Vice President of Sales; and Paul Pappenheimer, Vice President
of Materials. William Huber was the last active member of the original SOS
founding management.
In this first session, with their introductory "homework" about the
company already accomplished, the consultants presented their approach to the
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determination of systems needs -- the process described in this paper. They
described the critical success factors method and the prototype concept (both
of which will be discussed in later sections of this paper). In a major
substantive step, company objectives were discussed and clearly agreed upon.
The workshop had four benefits:
* The consultants established a managerial perspective for systems
development, one of linking information systems priorities to the
most important business activities.
* There was an initial step toward establishment of business priorities
through the definition (essentially a redefinition) of corporate
goals.
* Active involvement of the key member of the executive team, the
Chairman of the Board, was obtained.
* SOS executives were educated in the techniques to be utilized.
During the session William Huber found the approach described very much to
his liking. He had previously told Heldman, "Don't let anybody ask me what
information I need. People don't know what they need." The approach of
developing information systems based upon the understandable information
imperatives of critical business functions, not vaguely guessed at information
"needs," caught his attention. He was an active and influential participant
throughout, passing on in this and later sessions to the younger management
team much knowledge which had been gained in his several decades of managing
the business.
CSF Interviews. The critical success factors (CSF) method is a technique
designed to help managers and systems designers, working from a business or
managerial perspective, to identify the management information necessary to
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support the key business areas. Critical success factors for an individual
manager are the few key areas in which successful performance will lead to the
achievement of the manager's objectives. In effect, critical success factors
are the means to the objectives -- which are the desired ends. On a corporate
level, the CSFs are the key areas on which the company must focus in order to
achieve its objectives. The CSF interview process is designed to have each
manager interviewed explicitly state those things which are critical, both in
his own job and for the corporation. By voicing these CSFs, managers sharpen
their understanding of the priority areas in which information is necessary.
The ways in which these might be measured are also focused upon.[3,4] The
five key executives and ten other key managers in SOS were interviewed. In
addition to further communicating the desire to link all systems development
strongly to the needs of the business, the interviewing process also provided
the consultants with a significantly clarified understanding of the business,
the role of each individual, and the culture of the organization.
The Focusing Workshop. In this workshop, the consultants present a
"strawman" or corporate mission, objectives, and CSFs constructed from their
analysis of the prior workshop and the interviews. This working document
provides a basis for extended, often intense, discussion. This "strawman" is
a key to uncovering varying perceptions and disagreements among the management
team. This is the most significant and difficult step in the first phase. In
any organization, the agreement process faces a set of different individual
perspectives, different managerial loyalties, and differing desires.
Leadership by corporate management in untangling the myriad of differences and
focusing on the core elements of the business is essential.
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At SOS, corporate objectives developed in the earlier session were
reaffirmed. Most related to financial and marketing objectives. A set of 40
initially suggested potential critical success factors obtained through the
interviews were refined and consolidated into four. These were:
e Maintaining excellent supplier relationships
* Maintaining or improving customer relationships
* Merchandising available inventory to its most value-added use
* Utilizing available capital and human resources efficiently and
effectively
As Tom Heldman notes, "This is the key meeting. The interviews are merely
a preliminary, a 'softening up' process in which managers get an initial
opportunity to think deeply about the corporation as well as to develop
relationships with the consultants."
During the workshop what had previously been implicit was made explicit --
sometimes with surprising, insightful results. In Jacque Huber's words, "We
all knew what was critical for our company, but the discussion, sharing, and
agreeing was really important. What came out of it was a minor revelation.
Seeing it on the blackboard in black and white is much more significant than
carrying around a set of ideas which are merely intuitively felt."
Another SOS executive portrays the managerial insights gained from
focusing on an organization's CSFs in a somewhat different way. He says,
"During the meeting, our concept of our organizational structure went from an
organizational chart that looked like this:
zz z izZ
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to one which looked like this:"
"This was important. It affected our system's design enormously. More
importantly, it has affected the way we manage the business."
The interpersonal skill set of those persons running the "Focusing
Workshop," in this case the consulting team, is very significant. Business
knowledge and interpersonal skills are critical. However, the technique
itself easily engages the attention and involvement of the management team,
and eases the seminar leadership job. Again, in Heldman's words, "Focusing on
'what makes the company a success' intrigued almost all of top management. It
appealed to a group of good managers, allowing them to engage in a discussion
of what they knew best and what seemed important to them."
Also developed in this workshop were the set of measures for CSFs, a
sample of which is given in Exhibit 3. Finally, initial steps were taken at
assessing, from management's viewpoint, the implications of the set of
objectives, CSFs, and measures for information systems priorities.
PHASE TWO -- DEVELOPING WELL-UNDERSTOOD SYSTEMS PRIORITIES
The second phase, as Exhibit 2 illustrates, has two major steps. These
are concerned with the development of systems priorities and the gaining of
managerial confidence in the expected efficacy of the priority systems to
support their needs.
II
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Development of Systems Priorities. As the consultants reviewed the
results of the interviews and the working sessions, they turned to a period of
studying the business in more depth in the areas in which priority information
systems were indicated. At the end of this period, they identified three
distinct systems which would support the fundamental managerial processes.
The three key business systems necessary were those in support of the buying
and inventory management process, the marketing of steel, and the production
scheduling process.
An analysis of these three proposed systems showed that each significantly
affected the critical success factors of the firm. Inventory management
affected all of the critical success factors, most particularly supplier
relationships and efficient use of resources. The proposed marketing system
directly impacted customer relationships and merchandising. Finally,
production scheduling was significant with regard to the critical areas of
efficient and effective use of resources, merchandising and customer
relationships.
At SOS, as elsewhere, the transition from a business focus on objectives
and critical success factors to systems definition is not a straightforward
simple process. It is more an art form than a science. This business-systems
transition relies heavily on the technical expertise, systems knowledge, and
all-around consulting expertise of the design team (whether external
consultants and/or internal consultants are involved). But at SOS, as in
other cases in which we have been involved, the signficant systems needs were
strongly indicated from the preceding managerial discussion of goals, CSFs,
and measures.
Workshop on Decision Scenarios. While observing the key managers in their
daily activities, the consultants took note of recurring decisions and the
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questions the managers asked of themselves and others while making these
decisions. From these "decision situations" a set of "decision scenarios" was
developed. Each of the decision scenarios concerned a particular managerial
event and the questions which might be asked in formulating a decision.
Included were all relevant questions, both those which could be answered by
computer-based data and those which could not.
In a third working session, the three proposed, but as yet unbuilt systems
(all prototypes) were outlined to the managerial team. This third working
session, however, centered around the "decision scenarios." One of these is
presented in Exhibit 4. Working through a series of these scenarios, enabled
the managers to gain a much greater familiarity and insight into the workings
of the three proposed systems. They were able to see which questions would be
answered by the new systems, which would be left unanswered, and the way in
which data would be presented through "paper models" of proposed screen
formats.
In this session, the technical environment necessary to support the
systems, the necessary data in the system, and the source and frequency of
data collection were also discussed. With the voiced conviction of SOS
management that the systems were appropriate, detailed design was commenced.
PHASE THREE - Prototype System Development
As Exhibit 2 shows, the final phase of the process contains two major
steps. These are the creation of an initial detailed prototype design and
actual systems development.
Prototype Design. Even after systems are agreed upon, the exact method of
prototyping must be decided. The right type of prototype must be selected.
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Thus far, it appears to us that there are three significantly different types
of prototypes. Interestingly, one of each was called for at SOS. Prototypes
may be developed either in the form of information data bases, pilot systems,
or classical prototypes. The systems at SOS illustrate this. They are:
e An "information" data base for marketing support. By their very
nature, information data bases -- collections of data made accessible
to users -- are prototypes. No matter how careful the initial
systems design, it is impossible to have any manager define the exact
information he or she will use in making decisions. Most
decision-making processes are tenuously understood at best, and
knowledge of the data needed for them previous to automation is
incomplete. What is more, as a manager uses a data base, he gains
further insight into both the data he really needs and the methods of
access that he desires to get to and utilize that data. At SOS,
sales support was provided by an information data base originally
designated to include information on customers, potential customers,
open orders, and accounts receivable. The majority of the CSF
measures stated in Exhibit 3 were included in one form or another.
This prototype was, in current parlance, a DSS.
* A "pilot system" for inventory management. Pilot systems and pilot
plants have been built in the research and development process for
decades. These are systems which are a miniature replication of the
final production plan. Functionality is complete, tests are made
using the pilot to make sure that everything works. If so, the
process is then expanded in scale to the full production system. The
"pilot" class of prototype is exactly similar. It takes a piece of
an entire system and develops it completely with all functions. At
III
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SOS, the inventory management system developed was a pilot. One
separable segment of the inventory, approximately 15%, was put on the
computer.
* Production scheduling -- a "classical prototype". Prototype systems
(systems which the dictionary tells us "exhibit the essential
features of a later type"L5j (emphasis added) are built with an
initial fundamental, yet not complete, set of functions. The
prototype systems are then exercised to illustrate what such a system
can do. Further functionality is expected to be added later.L6] At
SOS, the production scheduling prototype was designed to provide the
initial functionality necessary to allow managers to queue work at
machines, generate schedules based on job priorities, and minimize
setup time. In DSS mode, the computer performs some functions
automatically, while interacting with schedulers for others.
Increased functionality is being continually added.
A major feature of each of the prototype systems which were developed at
SOS was the ability to provide some data for all levels of management. Most
of the systems which are routinely developed today emphasize either
operational control, management control, or strategic planning.[71 At SOS,
taking a top-down managerial approach -- a "vertical slice" philosophy as
shown in Exhibit 5 -- the systems contain the relevant data for operational
purposes, but they also provide the raw material for managerial reporting for
both management control applications and for partial input to strategic
planning. Emphasis is placed on the last two -- as implied by the heavy wedge
of the "slice" being at the top.
The prototyping process -- as opposed to full systems development -- is
important. Executives in the 1980s react to information systems proposals
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from the perspective of a lot of baggage carried forward from past experiences
during earlier days, when the technology had less capability, systems design
and development processes were significantly less facile, and software
development tools, as well as concepts of managerial involvement, were more
primitive. A lack of understanding of the new technology and an associated
fear on their part that the new computer systems will interrupt a smooth,
well-functioning managerial process, are highly understandable.
At SOS, not all of the key executives were "on board" until the
prototyping concept was fully evident. Although most of them became
intrigued, even excited, during the CSF phase (with the thought of actually
linking systems to business needs), Paul Pappenheimer for one was not. He
remained skeptical. "I had heard of a great number of computer horror
stories," he recalled. He was fearful that control of the inventory would be
lost in the conversion process and that the computer could not support his
somewhat unique inventory needs. (Each item of inventory is different at SOS
-- varying in quality, size, and many other attributes. Each steel coil needs
a full description.) It was not until decision scenarios were utilized and
early prototype design was well underway that Pappenheimer fully understood
the prototype approach and felt comfortable. He finally perceived the
prototype concept as a means of lowering the company's (and his) risks to an
acceptable level. As Heldman points out, "We're not just talking about
monetary risk here, although this is certainly a factor. Managers at all
levels are also concerned about the risk in the development of a non-viable
system to which the company is committed because of the expenditure. For
some, it is only when they realize that they can get their hands on the
prototype at an early stage and assess its utility before going forward that
they can relax." In short, a prototype:
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* reduces monetary risk
e reduces business risk
e allows a manager to inspect, work with, and shape the product as it
is being developed -- thus becoming comfortable with it in all
dimensions.
In recalling his experience, Pappenheimer says, "I would have slept better
at night if they (the consultants) would have fully communicated the prototype
concept from the beginning. Once the idea finally struck me, it really turned
me on. I went from negative to highly enthusiastic."
Systems Development. Actual development of all of the prototypes was done
on an IBM System 38, utilizing RPGIII. The system now has 28 terminals with
additional terminals on order. The final detailed design and programming were
performed by SOS staff with the aid of an outside programmer proficient in
RPGIII. The initial prototype development period was short for all systems.
As an example, the initial inventory prototype was up in two months. After
three months of operation, a significant redesign added new functionality.
This redesign process was repeated again after an additional six months,
illustrating fully the concept of "evolutionary design."[8j Other systems
were developed in comparable amounts of time.
The systems are now used by operational personnel and managers at all
levels. Some standard reports are issued, but most of the interaction is
through menu-based interactive processing. More significantly, today a
number of SOS personnel at all levels are learning the available query
language for the System 38 to allow them to interrogate the files on their
own. One of the first persons to attend query school and to use the facility
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actively was Jacques Huber. "If I could tell a staff person what I wanted in
the past, I can write my query today. I get my answers faster," says Huber.
Process Summary
Exhibits 1 and 2 summarize, in differing levels of detail, the three-phase
process as perceived by SOS management. The exhibits do not, however, show
the considerable "backroom" effort put in both by the consultants and the
systems developers. It should be stressed that there is a need for the
consultants to gain some background knowledge about the company before the
first phase. There is also a need for significant effort to understand the
details of some activities before the prototypes can be sketched out. The
creation of data bases and the development of control procedures to assure the
appropriate refreshing of data must be carried out by operational personnel
during the prototype system development stages. But these behind-the-scenes
processes have always been necessary. They remain a necessary backdrop to the
managerially-oriented process.
What has been accomplished through the use of this process? At one level,
all three systems are now up and functioning and all the usual advantages of
computerizing marketing data, inventory control, and production scheduling are
evident. Included among these are:
. Immediate access to order status. "Now," says saleswoman Brenda
Grant, "you can check exactly where your order is in the production
system while keeping the customer on hold. You don't have to check
with the plant and then make those long-distance calls back." Both
internal and external telephone tag is avoided. Another salesman
comments, "With the new system, what used to take an hour now takes
only a minute or two."
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e A significant increase in the number of sales calls that can be made
per salesperson. Time which used to be "wasted" in answering
customer queries as above, and in searching for raw material
inventory status, has been eliminated. In addition, customer and
prospect data available in the marketing information data base
enables salespeople to prepare for "cold calls" more efficiently.
* Improved understanding of customers. By using the available query
system, Jacque Huber and the sales personnel are analyzing customer
buying patterns to improve production efficiency.
e Improved management of slow-moving inventory. Both visibility into
the entire inventory status and analytic capability make this
possible. Pappenheimer cites the ability particularly to get to past
usage data which "previously was only in my head."
e More accurate inventory control. John Antes, manager of inventory
and material assignment, says, "The computer is faster and more
accurate. There are controls and validations. There were some
errors before, with the manual system."
e Improved production scheduling. Greg Parsley, manager of the first
shift in the plant, notes, "The system allows us to foresee problems
and to react to them sooner. Before, we never knew where we would be
in the future until we were there."
* Reduction in plant personnel. With the introduction of the system,
plant management has reduced staff while maintaining its workload.
In addition to improved scheduling, noted above, this has been made
possible by a reduced need to interact with sales personnel (also
noted above), the reduction of time searching for or correcting lost
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or inaccurate paperwork, and improved visibility into aspects of the
plant.
On a more significant level, the CSF-decision scenario-prototype process
has strongly affected the management team in a very positive way. In system
evaluation, one asks three questions:
(1) Did it work, and was something beneficial accomplished?
(2) What is management's attitude?
(3) With this experience, are they moving ahead?
The answer to the first question is given in the section above. As to the
second, there is a clear sense of both success and comfort in the top
management team at SOS today. As Wolf, the President, notes, "Our good
feelings today come from an approach to information systems which is based on
managing the business." Jacque Huber says that the SOS management team,
initially highly nervous that it would "mess with something that works," and
"lose control," was able to "come together," through this process, on a
systems plan. In addition, he says, "We have achieved in nine months at far
lower cost what we expected would take six years under the previously proposed
plan." Managerial attitude also appears to have been affected by four other
results of the process. These are:
e A sharper focus in the minds of all top managers on the few important
things to which they must direct their attention.
* As noted on page 10, an increased understanding of the
interdependence of the various parts of the business and the ability,
through the computer system, to take advantage of this knowledge.
e The transfer of a sizable segment of his knowledge from the retiring
Chairman to the younger management team made possible through the
multiple workshops in which various aspects of the business,
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particularly those most critical, were discussed. For Heldman, the
newest member of the management team, "the insights gained into the
company" were extremely useful. He further notes, "I would believe,
that for any information systems officer who may have been slightly
on the 'outside,' this process would provide tremendous insights into
the company and the ways in which top management thinks."
e The direct terminal-based access that management now has to data on
various aspects of the status of the company. Huber and Pappenheimer
rely on this daily.
It is also clear that the process will have a continuing future effect on
the company. Among the signs of this are:
* The three existing prototype systems are being continually given
additional functions or expanded in scope.
* Wolf, the CEO, has just commissioned a prototype system to develop a
"cost model" for SOS -- a system which he will be able to access
directly.
* Additional personnel are being sent to "query" school. CSF use is
being extended. Jacque Huber states, "A good manager and his team
can use CSFs in all phases of business activity. What is needed is a
broad educational program to introduce and promote the concepts of
CSF. I plan to introduce CSF to my sales managers soon."
Why did it work?
Is the process replicable in other companies? SOS is a mediu-szed
company in a single industry with a capable management team. Good management
is necessary. No consulting team can assist inadequate management to develop
a clear focus. However, size and single-industry status are not constraints
on the process. Index has utilized the CSF and prototyping phases many times
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with management teams in half-billion dollar companies and divisions of
multi-billion dollar organizations. Decision scenarios, the newest input into
the process appears to work well in other situations also. At the corporate
level of multi-division, billion-dollar conglomerates, the process is somewhat
different -- primarily in its end products. At this level, information data
bases are the primary prototype developed.
It should be stated that we are convinced this process will not work at
all times in all companies. Timing is key. Management must be ready to be
involved. Competitive pressures, a felt need to rethink computer priorities,
or sheer awareness of the increasing strategic importance of information
systems are all among a long list of enabling factors which make a successful
exercise possible. Given this, and we believe that these conditions are
increasingly evident in many organizations today, the success of the process
appears to arise from the following factors:
e The process makes an easy and quick link to top management and the
way it thinks. As Jacque Huber notes, "The businessman can relate to
CSFs. They make sense. They are a natural extension of objectives
and the planning process."
* The process focuses managerial attention on the business things that
are important -- thus providing a sense of comfort about building
information systems to support these areas. Huber, again, "The
businessman needs to be reminded to focus on the means after the ends
have been determined. The CSF process is the best focusing device I
have ever been exposed to."
o The process engages real management involvement. As Heldman notes,
"Most top executives really only provide token 'support' for
information systems. In this process, management spent considerable
Ill
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time talking about its own business. They were involved. And a
great amount of energy of the executive group went into the process.
Token 'support' is not enough. One winds up with systems that do not
affect the guts of the business."
* The consultants (whether internal or external) gain significant
insight into the business and therefore are more effective. This
process, in addition to providing managerial focus, enables the
system designers to better understand management and its needs.
Several days of managerial interaction centered around the business
itself provide a wealth of company-specific knowledge. As
Pappenheimer notes, "The accountants (who submitted the $2.4 million
bid) never grasped the business. They were working from an
information technology and sytems capability viewpoint, rather than
from a business perspective. Index grew to know us."
* Finally, managers recognize that risk is lower. There is a strong
managerial bias, in all companies, against committing vast sums of
money in areas which one does not fully understand. The CSFs
provided the knowledge as to why the systems should be developed.
Decision scenarios convinced management that the particular systems
would provide the information they needed to ask major questions at
all levels of management. And the prototypes made it possible for
management to see significant system capability before committing all
funding.
In summary, Heldman states:
"The organizational impact and change as a result of the systems has
been profound. In a year when our marketplace is collapsing we have
been able to stay ahead, respond, and serve our customers better.
This is a complete success story."
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Exhibit 1
A Three-Phase Process for Managerial Involvement
Linking Information Systems
to the Management Needs
of the Business
Key Technique:
Critical Success Factors Process
Developing Systems Priorities and
Gaining Confidence in the
Recommended Systems
Key Technique:
Decision Scenarios
IF
Rapid Development of Low Risk,
Managerially Useful, Systems
Key Technique:
Prototype Development,
Implementation, Use, and Refinement
.
.
Exhibit 2
A Three-Phase Process for Managerial Involvement
Phase One - Linking to the Business
CSF
I nterviews
Focusing
Workshop
Phase Two - Developing Well-Understood System Priorities
Development of
Systems Priorities
Workshop
on Decision Scenarios
Phase Three - Prototype Systems Development
Prototype
Design
Systems Development,
Use, and Refinement
Introductory
Workshop
Exhibit 3
Measures of one CSF
DATA CURRENT
TYPE MEASURE
CUSTOMER
RELATIONS
-Volume
-Inquiries
-Order/bid ratio
-Complaints and/or rejections of
material
-Customer turnover or lost accounts
-Decline in volume with customer
-Program account actual volume
vs. customer and SOS forecasts
-New accounts
-Conversions to program accounts
-On-time delivery:
to first promise date
to final need date
-Trends in credit rejections
-Tone of voice (esp. during
late delivery calls
-Finance and credit "handling" feedback
DATA TYPE: H = Hard
S = Soft
CURRENT MEASURE: M = Measured
A = Data Available
U = Data Unavailable
H
H
H
H
M
M
M
M
H
H
H
M
M
A
H
H
H
M
U
A
U
A
A
H
S
S
Exhibit 4
Sample Decision Scenario
Decision Scenario 1: PURCHASING
SITUATION
The Inventory Manager receives a call from a supplier offering an
extremely attractive purchase opportunity: A 1500 ton slab which can be
rolled to any width from 57 1/4 to 59 3/4 in either cold rolled or
galvanized prime coil. The price is .19 per pound.
QUESTIONS ASKED
-What does the economy look like overall?
-How have orders been keeping up?
-Are contract customers meeting expectations/using their reserves?
*-What was last week's order volume in prime cold roll?
*-What are prime cold roll inventory levels?
-Are we particularly low in any gage?
-Have we been too high in this area?
-What can I expect to use in the next two months?
-What is the supplier's situation?
-Is this a "once in a life time" situation?
-How badly do they need us here?
-Is this price likely to be offered again?
*-What have I paid for this item in the past?
-Who will get it if we refuse it?
* DENOTES QUESTIONS THAT CAN BE ANSWERED BY THE SYSTEM PROPOSED
Exhibit 4 (continued)
(PAPER MODEL OF OUTPUT)
INVENTORY LEVELS
TO REVIEW COLD ROLLED
INVENTORY LEVELS:
PRODUCT DESC
GRADE
GAGES *1
TOTAL
283
636
2014
7565
7025
279
143
67
*3
AVAILABLE
TO
PROMISE
35
101
234
945
939
0
0
0
AVAILABLE
TO
PROMISE
12
16
12
13
14
0
0
0
50 25
135. 20
328 27
1324 25
1229 25
41 30
31 20
14 21
TOTAL: 14792 3220 18012
*1. A specific gage i.e.
Range of gages i.e.
All gages
.031,
.031,
ALL
2250 12.5
.044
*2. Gages without inventory do not appear
*3. Neither reserved for program account nor assigned.
*4. (on Hand plus on order less open orders)
(last month's sales / days in month * 7
STEEL
CR
SOS
ALL
*2
GAGE
,022
,026
,032
,044
,055
,068
,097
,112
(OH)
ON HAND
232
636
1540
6213
5769
192
143
67
LAST
MONTH
SALES
(O.ORD)
ON ORDER
51
0
474
1352
1256
87
0
0
*4
WEEKS
OF
SALES
3152
Exhibit 5
Vertical Slice Prototypes
'STRATEGIC
MANAGERIAL
OPERATIONAL
